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“Diesmal fehlt die Biologie!”: Max Horkheimer, Richard Thurnwald, and the
Biological Prehistory of German Sozialforschung

Introduction: Biology, Social Research, and Disciplinary Authority

The turbulent history of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social
Research; hereafter Institut) with its several stations including Frankfurt, Geneva, Paris,
and New York, has become so central to the many narratives of twentieth-century social
thought that it is easy to forget that in its early history, the Institut did not stand out in the
German academic field. It was one of a number of attempts to redevelop the institutional
structure of German scholarship both inside and outside existing university frameworks.
The efforts of the Institut’s members were not always repaid with respect or
understanding. When Max Horkheimer assumed the directorship in 1930 and sought to
reinvigorate the Institut’s publication program, be encountered vigorous resistance from
other scholars. The Institut’s house journal, the Archiv für die Geschichte des
Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung (Archive for the History of Socialism and the
Workers’ Movement; known as Grünbergs Archiv) was to become the Zeitschrift für
Sozialforschung (Journal of Social Research; hereafter: ZfS), an organ for the
dissemination of the Institut’s work across the numerous disciplines engaged in research
into social phenomena.1 Even some of Horkheimer’s closer colleagues perceived his

Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this article are by the author.
1
Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social
Research 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 26-27. Jay quotes Leo Lowenthal as follows: The ZfS
was “less a forum for different viewpoints than a platform for the Institut’s convictions.” See also: Rolf
Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael
Robertson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 38, 116-19. After the emigration of Horkheimer and the Institut
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moves as a competitive threat to their own publication programs. Horkheimer, for
example, even sent Leo Lowenthal by plane to speak to the sociologist Leopold von
Wiese in Cologne, who had expressed concern that the editorial program of the ZfS
would overlap with that of his own journal, the Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie
(Cologne Quarterly of Sociology).2
The Berlin ethnologist and sociologist Richard Thurnwald raised perhaps the most
energetic opposition to Horkheimer’s project from within the field of German social
science. Thurnwald was editor-in-chief of the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und
Soziologie, which he was at that moment in the process of redefining and reorganizing
into a multilingual (German-English) journal with the bilingual title Sociologus:
Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie/A Journal of Sociology and Social
Psychology (hereafter: Sociologus/ZVS).3 Thurnwald and his student, colleague, and
managing editor, Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, corresponded with Horkheimer and at length
among themselves about the Institut, the ZfS, the status of the ZfS relative to their own
journal, and Horkheimer’s motivations and intentions.4 Their exchange demonstrates that

to New York, the ZfS was renamed Studies in Philosophy and Social Science for its final two volumes
(VIII/1939 and IX/1941).
2
Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 27. Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 112.
3
On the fluid disciplinary and methodological status of Völkerpsychologie see: Matti Bunzl, “Franz Boas
and the Humboldtian Tradition: From Volksgeist and Nationalcharakter to an Anthropolgical Concept of
Culture,” In Volksgeist as Method and Ethic. History of Anthropology, ed. George W. Stocking, Jr., vol. 8
(Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 17-78. Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and
Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 52-4.
4
This material is heretofore unremarked in the published primary and secondary literature on the early
history of the Institut and the ZfS. It is represented in correspondence from between 1931 and 1933 found
in the Richard Christian Thurnwald Papers held in the Department of Manuscripts and Archives at the
Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. Thurnwald was Visiting
Professor at Yale intermittently in the 1930s. The Thurnwald Papers contain three letters from Horkheimer
to Thurnwald that are not published in the Horkheimer Gesammelte Schriften. They are dated 6 August
1932, 7 November 1932, and 28 January 1933. One unpublished letter (of 15 December 1932) from
Thurnwald to Horkheimer is also in the Thurnwald collection. The correspondence between Thurnwald
and Mühlmann, and between them and their publishers, also discusses the matter at length, and refers to a
visit made by Horkheimer to Mühlmann in Berlin in late 1931 that is also unremarked in the literature.
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at this early stage, Horkheimer and his Institut colleagues framed the intellectual and
institutional development of their research program around the problem of disciplinary
definition and control. Other scholars registered their arguments, and sought to parry
their moves.5
The disciplinary concept that became the focus of the disagreements between
Horkheimer, Thurnwald, and Mühlmann was biology. Though their educational paths
and political investments differed greatly, both Horkheimer and Thurnwald sought at the
beginning of their scholarly careers to explore how human social phenomena might fall
within the purview of the rapidly expanding methods and claims of the biological field.
They went on, in the 1920s and 1930s, to develop critiques of what they perceived to be
an inappropriate identification of biology with social thought and theory. Again, their
critiques were profoundly different: Horkheimer’s represented a philosophically
grounded attempt to redevelop the basic disciplinary structure of social inquiry, and
Thurnwald’s emerged from his encounter with race theory and his work on the use of
anthropological field methods in the exploration of social behavior. Both scholars,
however, hoped to influence social praxis through their research, and they therefore
recognized – though only at first through resistance to one another – that their
disciplinary concerns covered much of the same intellectual and institutional ground.
The conflict between them therefore originated as a personal disagreement generated by
conflicting institutional interests. Nonetheless it threw off a series of documents that
5

The Institut’s early program and publications so highlighted the problems of disciplinarity in the
development of new modes of social research that recent scholars and critics have willingly applied the
anachronistic term “interdisciplinary” to its work. Helmut Dubiel notes that the term ‘interdisciplinary’
first came into use in the United States during the 1950s. Helmut Dubiel, Theory and Politics: Studies in
the Development of Critical Theory, trans. Benjamin Gregg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 119-27, 189n7.
This anachronism notwithstanding, scholarship on the Institut’s program in the early and mid-1930s has
settled on the concept “interdisciplinary materialism” as the most appropriate description of the Institut’s
goals and methods.
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provide a nuanced representation of how biology as a disciplinary concept mapped the
boundary conditions not only for their overlapping scholarly work and practice, but also
their theorization of social research in general.
In Horkheimer’s exchange with Thurnwald and Mühlmann, biology’s politically
and ideologically charged relationship with numerous other fields of scholarly inquiry
into social phenomena became the flash point. In the early 1930s, the period of the initial
construction of the programs of and justifications for the Institut and the ZfS, biology
represented the far edge of the Institut’s potential network of disciplinary contact and
communication. Thurnwald and Mühlmann also continually expressed concern about
biology’s relationship to sociology and social research in Sociologus/ZVS, in their own
ethnographic and sociological research, and in their correspondence.6 Later, after their
conflict, Horkheimer refrained from claims that biology stood within the disciplinary
purview of the Institut’s program. Nonetheless, biology and its structures of justification
had left indelible marks on the development of Horkheimer’s thought, on the Institut’s
practice, and on the editorial program of the ZfS. In the simplest sense, Horkheimer
chose after his disagreement with Thurnwald and Mühlmann to eliminate biology from
the programmatic content of the Institut’s ‘interdisciplinary materialism.’ He retained it,
however, as a central moment of reference in his own argument and practice.7

6

The early volumes of Sociologus/ZVS always included a section of reviews of recent publications in
“Biologie.”
7
Philosophical interest in the consequences of biological inquiry has recently reemerged among the
intellectual successors to the Institut, however, in the work of Jürgen Habermas, who has dedicated much
of his effort in the past few years to issues of bioethics and the philosophical and ethical consequences of
the potential for the genetic manipulation of embryos. See Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature,
trans. William Rehg, Hella Beister, and Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). The Deutsche Zeitschrift
für Philosophie 50.2 (2002) was dedicated in large part to an exchange between Habermas and several
respondents on Habermas’s bioethical turn.
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Both Horkheimer and Thurnwald perceived that the term biology in the early
twentieth century did not represent a strictly defined discipline, but rather a multifarious
field that had developed in the nineteenth century through attempts to develop a complete
understanding of life, from the level of the physiochemical mechanisms of the cell to the
complex psychosocial manifestations of human behavior. They were not alone in their
polyvalent understanding of the conceptual and programmatic content of biology. Many
of the leading representatives of biological thought and institutions competed to lay claim
to the most audacious of total arguments about the organization of the natural world,
from the simplest structure of matter to the most complex manifestations of the diversity
of life – including individual and social behavior. Biology therefore became not a
methodologically autonomous field of scientific investigation, but rather a set discursive
links among proliferating sets of institutions and sub-disciplines.8 The term delineated a
kind of vestigial negative image of the interests held and promulgated by various actors
inquiring into living organisms, including the human, and the biological field functioned
as a fluid and protean network of scholars and commentators who competed for prestige
and resources. Well into the twentieth century, in fact, there were not even discrete
departments marked by the rubric ‘biology’ in German universities. Biology was rather a
loosely applied marker of the both commonalities and the competition between the
institutionally grounded fields of anatomy, physiology, botany, zoology, natural history,
and various branches of medicine.9 Biology’s meta-disciplinary character led to

8

For a nuanced summary of biology’s position as a constitutive concept among late nineteenth century
German social reformers, see: Kevin Repp, “‘More Corporeal, More Concrete’: Liberal Humanism,
Eugenics, and German Progressives at the Last Fin de Siècle,” Journal of Modern History 72 (September
2000): 683-730.
9
Lynn Nyhart, Biology Takes Form: Animal Morphology and German Universities, 1800-1900 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 205-6, 366-69.
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controversy, but it also gave great persuasive power to those who chose to make biology
a proxy for total explanation of the natural and human worlds. A number of important
scholars of late nineteenth century German intellectual history, including Gunter Mann,
Herbert Schnädelbach, and Helmuth Plessner, have used the term “biologism” to
represent this proliferation of persuasive claims, and have gone so far as to argue, like
Plessner, that this period was the “hour of authoritarian biology.”10
Charles Sedgwick Minot, the Harvard anatomist, noted biology’s fragmentary but
ambitious character in a series of lectures he gave at the University of Jena in 1912,
published in 1913 as Modern Problems of Biology. In Minot’s opinion, “Unfortunately,
biology has not yet become a united science, but consists of sundry disciplines more or
less separated from one another.”11 Nonetheless he was fully confident that “true and
real biology,” that is the incipient “unified biological science,” would answer the broadest
human questions: “Consciousness, the relation of the soul to the body, the origin of
reason, the relations of the external world to psychical perception, and most subjects of
philosophical thought are fundamentally biological phenomena which the naturalist
investigates and analyzes.”12

10

Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 1831-1933, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 99-100. Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation: Über die politische
Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982). Gunther Mann, ed. Biologismus im 19.
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Enke, 1973).
11
Charles S. Minot, Modern Problems of Biology: Lectures Delivered at the University of Jena,
December, 1912 (Philadelphia: P. Blakiston’s Son, 1913), 103.
12
Minot, Modern Problems, 103, 104. Historians of biology still accept Minot’s logic. Betty Smocovitis
recapitulates much of his vocabulary in her resume of the early disciplinary development of American
biology: “The struggle to unify the biological sciences is one of the central features of the history of
biology. Emerging only in the nineteenth century, biology was characterized by disunity to such an extent
and for so long that repeated attempts to unify this science through professional societies proved to be a
nearly impossible task. Charting the rocky road toward organized biology in America during the 18891923 period – a key period for the institutionalization of biology – historian Toby Appel concluded:
‘Numerous biological sciences were established in America, but no unified science of biology.’ So
formidable was this task that the hope of ever formulating a unified biological society representing a
unified science of biology appeared to have been largely abandoned by 1923.” Vassiliki Betty Smocovitis,
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Thus in biology’s very lack of concrete disciplinary form, in its status as a metadisciplinary space of contingent, but potentially total scientific knowledge about humans
as living, social beings, it represented both a positive and a negative model of the kind of
interdisciplinary social research that both Horkheimer and Thurnwald hoped to be able to
promote through their journals. It thus revealed the full range of difficulties and frictions
inherent in their institutional projects.

Max Horkheimer, Sozialforschung, and the Valences of Materialism

Recent literature describes the founding and early development of the Institut as
the creation of an endowed space for exchange with and critique of the models of
scholarship pursued within the rigid disciplinary structure of the German university
system of the 1920s. Martin Jay reads Horkheimer’s 1931 address on “The Current
Condition of Social Philosophy and the Task of an Institute of Social Research [Die
gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für
Sozialforschung]” as proposing an “interdisciplinary, synthetic” scholarship on social
phenomena that could unite the insights of the many disciplines and sub-disciplines
proliferating within and around institutionalized scholarship in Germany.13 Taking up
Horkheimer’s claim in his “Materialism and Metaphysics (Materialismus und
Metaphysik)” that “materialism calls for the unification of philosophy and science,”
several scholars employ the term “interdisciplinary materialism” to describe

Unifying Biology: The Evolutionary Synthesis and Evolutionary Biology (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996) 97-98.
13
Jay, Dialectical Imagination, 25; Wiggershaus, Frankfurt School, 38-39.
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Horkheimer’s program for the Institut and the ZfS in the 1930s.14 The choice of this term
to describe Horkheimer’s project contains a particularly revealing irony: it recapitulates
the historical roots of Horkheimer’s own reflections on the status of biology as a
materialist project. In many ways, late nineteenth century biology itself was a kind of
“interdisciplinary materialism,” one that sought in the concept “life” a unification of
scientific inquiry from the smallest scale to the largest through investigation of living
organisms, their physical and chemical determinants, and their interactions. For many
reasons, of course, biology failed to become a systematic field offering a complete
representation of the living world. Not the least of these was the proliferation of claims
under the rubric Lebensphilosophie.15 Nonetheless vigorous and often highly personal
debates about whether life can be understood on a purely material basis raged in German
academic philosophy and natural science throughout the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth.
The relationship between biological thought and materialism is complex, because
materialism in the late nineteenth century had two valences that are generally read
differently by natural scientists and social scientists: “mechanistic materialism” and
“dialectical materialism.”16 Much of the fascination and much of the difficulty in reading
Horkheimer’s early work emerges because when he spoke of “Materialismus” he always
meant both categories. Horkheimer’s programmatic “critical theory” of the mid-1930s
14

See: Seyla Benhabib, Wolfgang Bonß, and John McCole, eds., On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). The term “interdisciplinary materialism” is employed by both Jürgen
Habermas and Wolfgang Bonß in the volume. Axel Honneth prefers “interdisciplinary social science.”
The quotation here is taken from Hauke Brunkhorst, “Dialectical Positivism of Happiness: Max
Horkheimer’s Materialist Deconstruction of Philosophy,” in Benhabib et al. 91. Dubiel, despite his
misgivings about the anachronistic character of the term, uses it.
15
See: Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 139-160.
16
Garland A. Allen, “The Classical Gene: Its Nature and Legacy,” Mutating Concepts, Evolving
Disciplines: Genetics, Medicine and Society, L. S. Parker and R. A. Ankeny, eds. (Dordrecht/Boston:
Kluwer, 2002) 11-41.
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can in fact be read as an attempt to develop an academic practice that seeks to dismantle
the barriers that appear to separate these two valences of materialism, and that have been
consciously and unconsciously constructed by various established academic disciplines,
especially philosophy and the natural sciences.17 Mechanistic materialism seeks
reductionist explanations of physical and physiological phenomena through the
development of arguments that complex wholes can be understood completely through
analysis into their simpler constituent parts. Mechanistic materialism thus understands
change as the predictable responses of a system of parts to external forces. Dialectical
materialism accepts the explanatory power of the analysis of complex systems, but
refuses to reduce these systems only to the interactions of their parts. In dialectically
understood systems, change is thus an emergent characteristic of the system in the
irreducible entirety of its dynamics.18
The history of biology is also the history of conflict between these two
materialisms. From the beginnings of biology as a concept, biological problems have
driven the development of mechanistic materialism. Building on Frederick Gregory’s
claims about materialism in nineteenth century Germany, especially as it was found in the
work of Carl Vogt, Jakob Moleschott, and Ludwig Büchner, Ernst Mayr emphasizes the
centrality of this valence of materialism, which he calls “strongly reductionist
materialism.”19 Mayr also emphasizes the ways in which scholars perceived change in

17

Stanley Pierson, Leaving Marxism: Studies in the Dissolution of an Ideology (Stanford: Stanford
University Press), 96.
18
Allen, “The Classical Gene,” 17-19.
19
Frederick Gregory, Scientific Materialism in Nineteenth Century Germany (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977).
Ernst Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge:
Belknap/Harvard, 1982), 128. Important here is also the concept of Naturphilosophie and its consequences
in philosophy and biology. See: Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and
Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
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living systems teleologically throughout the nineteenth century.20 The biological thought
of Ernst Haeckel, especially thorough its late nineteenth century mediation in Haeckel’s
widely disseminated system of philosophical ‘monism,’ represents the most thorough
attempt to construct a system of the total explanation of all of the phenomena of life,
from the simplest chemical constituents to the most complex issues of human social and
political behavior, out of the general postulates of mechanistic materialism.21 The at once
simplest and most radical of Haeckel’s many statements of the foundational status of
mechanistic causality in his thought comes at the beginning of his career, in the first of
his great synthetic treatises, the General Morphology of the Organisms (Generelle
Morphologie der Organismen; 1866).22 The preface to this work states its final goal: to
explain organismal forms and their development “through mechanistic-causal explanation
(durch mechanisch-kausale Begründing).”23 Haeckel’s claims reverberated for decades
through German academic natural science and philosophy.
Dialectical materialism as a concept is, of course, generally more closely
associated with the historical, philosophical, and political traditions of Marxism than it is

20

Mayr, Growth, 528-31. See also: Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in
Nineteenth-Century German Biology, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Stephen Jay
Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard, 1977).
21
On Haeckel’s monism see: Jürgen Sandmann, Der Bruch mit der humanitären Tradition: Die
Biologisierung der Ethik bei Ernst Haeckel und anderen Darwinsten seiner Zeit (Stuttgart: G. Fischer,
1990). Horst Groschopp, Dissidenten: Freidenkerei und Kultur in Deutschland (Berlin: Dietz, 1997).
From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004). Hopelessly reductive but still often cited is: Daniel Gasman, The Scientific Origins of
National Socialism (London: Macdonald Elsevier, 1971).
22
The full (and baroque) title of Haeckel’s work emphasized the mechanistic qualities of his strategies of
explanation: Generelle Morphologie der Organismen: allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen FormenWissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin reformirte Descendenz-Theorie
[General Morphology of the Organisms: General Foundations of the Organic Science of Forms, as
Mechanistically Grounded through the Theory of Evolution as Reformed by Charles Darwin] (Berlin: G.
Reimer, 1866).
23
Quoted in Mayr, Growth, 115.

10

with biological thought.24 Yet it is precisely in the biological field of the period around
1900 that dialectical materialism found its profoundest challenges. If biology indeed held
the potential to provide systematic – and possibly teleological – explanation of all of the
phenomena of life including the social, then the integrative and antireductionist claims of
dialectical thought seemed to life scientists and philosophers alike to be well suited to the
diversity of their object of investigation.25 Beginning with Friedrich Engels, many
socialist thinkers sought to explore how nature, life, and history might be construed as
mutually constitutive.26 A wide range of German socialist thinkers also saw Darwinism
as evidence for their proposed trajectories of historical and political change and
development. Predictably, their claims also generated resistance.27 Haeckel, for
example, savaged any reading of evolutionary theory that appeared to venture support for
socialist political claims.28 Anne Harrington, the most thorough recent historian of
biological and psychological holism, represents succinctly the problem that these figures
struggled to solve: it often appeared that “a mechanistic approach to nature had nothing in
24

Garland Allen notes how some scholars used “holistic” and “dialectical” interchangeably to refer to this
valence of materialism, especially when it has been linked to the life sciences. Garland Allen, “The
Distinction between Mechanistic and Holistic Materialism,” In Allen, Life Science in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 103-6. Martin Jay uses the terms “holistic” and
“holism” largely synonymously with “totality” in his exploration of Western Marxism – at the same time
that he emphasizes that that Marxism was “far more dialectical than materialist,” and that the Second
International (1889-1914) “did not dwell with any sustained interest on the issue of totality.” Martin Jay,
Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984) 3, 66.
25
The Sorbonne zoologist Marcel Prenant was perhaps the most prestigious practicing life scientist
associated with this opinion in the 1930s. See: Marcel Prenant, Biology and Marxism, trans. C. Desmond
Greaves (New York: International Publishers, 1938).
26
Critical Marxists of the twentieth century found Engels’s work reductive, but worthy of careful
explication. See: Ernst Bloch, “Exkurs über Engels’ Versuch ‘Dialektik der Natur,” In Bloch, Das
Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972), 359-71.
27
See: Richard Weikart, Socialist Darwinism: Evolution in German Socialist Thought From Marx to
Bernstein (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1998).
28
In 1877, Haeckel publicly accused his teacher and colleague Rudolf Virchow of giving solace to the
partisans of socialist readings of evolutionary thought – and Virchow shot back in print with a vigorous
denial of any such intent. See: Peter Zigman, “Ernst Haeckel und Rudolf Virchow: Der Streit um den
Charakter der Wissenschaft in der Auseinandersetzung um den Darwinismus,” Medizinhistorisches Journal
35 (2000): 263-302.
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common with a materialistic understanding of nature.”29 Martin Jay’s arguments that
twentieth century Western Marxists reconstructed a totalizing theory of nature and
society thus gain an additional layer.30 Interest in dialectical models of explanation
among biologists exists even into the present, and the work of Richard Lewontin, most
clearly articulated in his book written with Richard Levins and entitled The Dialectical
Biologist, articulates the issues involved most clearly. Lewontin, rare among practicing
biological scientists, is also willing to credit the Marxist tradition with a large and direct
measure of influence over biological explanation.31
Scholarly interest in the problems raised by attempts to develop systems of
investigation and explanation that could be commensurate to the apparent irreducibility
of living systems in fact well predates Marxist thought. Ernst Cassirer regarded this issue
as a central element in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy.32 He argues that
the entirety of the half of the Critique of Judgment dedicated to “teleological judgment” –
that is to the problem of developing standards of judgment adequate to the appearance of
purposiveness in living organisms – seeks an answer to this friction between systematic,
analytical explanation and interdependent living systems:
It is no contradiction to imagine a nature that obeys the rules of connection
according to law, as they are specified in the principles of substance, cause, and
so on, and that in other respects discloses an irreducible diversity in the manifold

29

Anne Harrington. Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 13.
30
Jay emphasizes that “German bourgeois culture during much of the nineteenth century tended to favor
holistic modes of thought.” Jay, Marxism and Totality, 73.
31
Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1985), 267-79.
32
Jay also credits Cassirer with recognizing the significance of the “Discourse of Totality before Western
Marxism.” Jay, Marxism and Totality, 30-31.
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of its appearances, a diversity that would never permit us to order them according
to genus and species.33
Cassirer thus describes Kant’s later philosophy of inquiry into living things as a kind of
emergent dialectics of critical inquiry into an object of infinite diversity. This moment of
incommensurability in scientific explanation would haunt German academic philosophy
throughout the nineteenth century, and dominate the interest of the generation of German
neo-Kantian academic philosophers – of which Cassirer was perhaps the youngest
important exponent – that trained Horkheimer and his many collaborators and
competitors.34
The relationship between the mechanistic and dialectical valences of materialism
structured Horkheimer’s thought from its earliest development. In the 1920s,
Horkheimer and his colleagues, including Theodor W. Adorno, Georg Lukács, Ernst
Bloch (and even Martin Heidegger in the pre-Sein und Zeit period) dedicated much of
their philosophical effort to attempts to interrogate the varieties of materialism.35 This
effort emerged from their attempts to delineate new territory within the discipline of
philosophy that could separate them from their neo-Kantian teachers, who had invested
much of their careers in mapping the boundaries of the natural sciences.36 Horkheimer’s
university studies were situated within this set of attempts to reexamine the materialist
33
Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, trans.
William Woglom and Charles Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 125.
34
Lukács emphasized the underappreciated significance of Southwest German neo-Kantians Heinrich
Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband in setting the terms of the late nineteenth-century debate about scientific
inquiry, human life, and human society. Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (Darmstadt:
Luchterhand, 1974), 404-5, 521.
35
Lukács and Horkheimer remained relatively sympathetic toward the positions held by the neo-Kantians.
Bloch was not. He introduces his chapter on them in Das Materialismusproblem with the lapidary sentence
“The power to think conceptually decreased soon thereafter.” Bloch, Materialismusproblem, 84.
36
On the centrality of neo-Kantianism’s critique of natural-scientific epistemology in late nineteenthcentury German academic philosophy see: Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 56-58. See also: Klaus
Christian Köhnke, The Rise of neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and
Positivism, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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tradition. He studied philosophy extensively, but his understanding of both the potential
and the limits of natural scientific inquiry developed largely out of his encounter with
Gestalt psychology. The early stages of Horkheimer’s doctoral training took place in the
laboratory of the Gestalt psychologist Adhémar Gelb.37 Gelb and his collaborator Kurt
Goldstein ran the Institute for Research into the Consequences of Brain Injuries at
Frankfurt in the early 1920s, which explored experimental possibilities for the
rehabilitation of soldiers with neurological injuries previously considered fully
debilitating.38 Gelb and the Gestaltists perceived no disciplinary boundary between
Gestalt psychology and biology, or between scientific inquiry, medicine, and the
explanation of complex human perceptions and interactions. Their understanding of
physical reality and living systems was fundamentally holistic. Anne Harrington, in her
study of the valences of early twentieth-century German holistic thought, describes the
guiding principle of early Gestalt psychology as follows: “…Gestalt theory argued for the
possibility of retaining a place for human significance in nature but without sacrificing
rigorous experimental standards of traditional natural science.”39 Horkheimer began his
dissertation research at Gelb’s and Goldstein’s institute in 1921, and intended to explore
the physiological functioning of vision. For a number of reasons – including the fact that
investigators in Copenhagen published work very similar to his dissertation research –
Horkheimer chose not to pursue his empirical work with Gelb, and he developed his early
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academic writings as philosophical tracts under the Frankfurt neo-Kantian Hans
Cornelius.40
Both Horkheimer’s dissertation and his Habilitationsschrift addressed an aspect
of the German philosophical tradition that bore directly on the development of biology as
a concept. This aspect was the same issue that drew Cassirer’s interest: Kant’s arguments
about the nature of ‘teleological judgment’ in the Critique of Judgment. The dissertation,
completed in 1922 and entitled On the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment (Zur
Antinomie der teleolgischen Urteilskraft), explored the problem of the explanation of
living processes. Kant regarded reason as inadequate for the investigation of living
things, because those living things, when reduced to their constituent parts, appear not as
a set of causally linked processes, but as a set of purposive structures. In Kant’s critical
system, therefore, only the faculty of judgment can elucidate life and its conceptual
problems.41 Horkheimer argued that Kant’s views on the antinomy between reason and
the teleological judgment which explains life generate a further antinomy, one that
reveals a tension in Kant’s arguments about the correspondence between practical and
theoretical judgment and thus prefigures the dialectical nature of later philosophical
systems.42 This antinomy emerges concretely as that between teleological judgment and
mechanical explanation. Horkheimer reads Kant’s arguments, including those in the
Critique of Judgment, as privileging mechanical explanation, because teleological
judgment is only a heuristic device that enables inquiry into living processes that appear
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to be incommensurate to reason. Thus in Horkheimer’s reading, Kant regards
teleological judgment as a lesser form of inquiry, one that does not reach the level of true
explanation. Horkheimer makes this claim with specific reference to the disciplinary
fields of physics and biology:
4. Physics and biology: both have the same concept of event, namely the
mechanical. In any case, the sciences of “organic” and “inorganic” nature differ
according to Kant not in the general structure of their explanations. The former
do require as a “makeshift” (U. 320) a teleological “guideline for the observation
of a type of natural things” (U. 297). Nonetheless both branches of the natural
sciences – at least in all of their constitutive judgments – have the same concept
of the formation and development of such things: that, namely, every natural
object, “with respect to the elements that it receives from nature outside of itself,
must only be regarded as an eduction” (U. 287).43
Kant thus still fundamentally subordinates biological thought to physical thought, and
Horkheimer sums up Kant’s opinion as follows: “If one wanted to understand the
expressions development, growth, life processes etc. within biological theories as having
a special meaning, that would be an error....”44
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The Horkheimer of 1922 has a particular solution to this antinomy in Kant’s
thought: the holistic quality of Gestalt thinking, which is in its most basic disciplinary
form biological thought, because it addresses the wholeness of the organism.
Horkheimer raises this point early in the dissertation, in the sections following his
discussion of Kant’s “principle of formal purposiveness in nature (Prinzip der formalen
Zweckmäßigkeit in der Natur).” In the section entitled “Consequence of the Principle [of
generation] for Biology in Particular (Konsequenz des Grundsatzes [der Erzeugung] für
die Biologie im besonderen)” Horkheimer reduces Kant’s ideas to the simplest postulate
of biological holism: “Kant’s application to biology can, in very simple brevity, be made
clear in something like the following way. – The living body is a whole within nature.”45
Horkheimer returns to this claim late in the dissertation, and uses it to rescue Kant’s
system from its own inadequate understanding of living things. First he notes that
modern physics is beginning to demonstrate the same need for holistic explanation
beyond the purely mechanical: “Mechanical explanation, which for Kant is explanation
par excellence, is, as he himself witnesses, inadequate in the biological sciences....
Modern research has now also clearly ascertained this inadequacy in physical
problems.”46 Kant’s system therefore becomes open to the solution of its secondary
antinomy through the holistic inquiry enabled by Gestalt thought: “In recent philosophy
the theory of Gestalt qualities has stood in contrast to the Kantian view. It argues that a
whole as such has characteristics that are lost through division into parts, because they
45
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only accrue to the unity that was originally present.”47 The young Horkheimer thus
insists that the tenets of mechanistic materialism alone cannot facilitate an appropriate
understanding of Kant’s philosophy or of biological thought and inquiry in general.
In his 1925 Habilitationsschrift, On Kant’s Critique of Judgment as Bond
Between Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Über Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft als
Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie), Horkheimer further
elaborated his position. In it he expanded his exploration of the valences of Kant’s
discussion of teleological judgment to encompass Kant’s other major category of
reflective judgment: the aesthetic. Horkheimer analyzes the links between these two
varieties of judgment around a distinction central to Gestalt thought: that between
cognition and experience. He further glosses the spheres of teleological and aesthetic
judgment with the disciplinary terms ‘biology’ and ‘art.’
The Critique of Judgment divides into two parts – into the critiques of aesthetic
and of teleological judgment. – The justice of this division, that is of the inclusion
of two so heterogeneous cultural spheres as those represented by art and biology
in the field of the activity of one and the same faculty – that of reflective
judgment – may at first glance appear highly questionable.... According to the
introductory statements about the function of the Critique of Judgment within the
entirety of Kantian philosophy, the factual reason is easy to recognize: analysis of
those unities that can be experienced, and the formation of which cannot be traced
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back to the exclusively aggregating function of the faculty of cognition, represents
the function of the entire work.48
Here Horkheimer emphasizes Kant’s argument that the cognitive faculties must approach
living organisms and aesthetic objects by parallel means, because they both must be
experienced rather than simply enumerated through observation. This separates them
from other fields of scholarly or scientific inquiry.49
Horkheimer has here made the disciplinary language of Gestalt thought a less
immediately present element of his argument than it was in his dissertation, but he retains
his interest in the emergent qualities of living and aesthetic systems under human
observation, and he continues to focus on Kant’s claims that mechanistic explanations are
inadequate to life and art. His summary comments on teleological judgment make this
clear:
The basic thesis of the Critique of Teleological Judgment which was to be
analyzed here claims that: insofar as organic products of nature display
characteristics that cannot be explained as “a product of the parts and their powers
48
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and faculties of individual combination,” it is only possible for us to think of them
as purposes....50
Horkheimer thus develops Kant’s critique of Enlightenment materialism, with its wideranging consequences for the disciplinary development of the biological sciences, into the
basis for much of his own early work.
Through the late 1920s and early 1930s, as he was developing the intellectual and
institutional grounding for the Institut and the ZfS, Horkheimer sought to develop in his
own work an independent understanding of materialism that sought to be philosophically
and historically adequate to both the mechanistic and the dialectical valences of
materialist thought. Jay, in his reading of Horkheimer’s programmatic statement for the
Institut, describes Horkheimer’s investigations of the relationship between materialism
and scientific disciplinarity with reference to another term with important biological
valences: ‘natural philosophy.’ Social philosophy (Sozialphilosophie), one of the early
terms employed by Horkheimer to describe the work of the Institut, “was to be
understood as a materialist theory enriched and supplemented by empirical work, in the
same way that natural philosophy was dialectically related to individual scientific
disciplines.”51 Horkheimer saw that empirical inquiry, whether in the social or the
natural sciences, had a tendency to fragment into competing disciplines with vested
interests in preventing communication and exchange.52 The Institut presented an
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opportunity for the development of a kind of critical, meta-disciplinary philosophy that
could counteract the incentives to specialization and ideology construction that were
endemic to academic institutions. It therefore held the potential to enable a reconciliation
of natural scientific method and philosophical argument. Horkheimer imagined himself
as the central node in this incipient institutional network of meta-disciplinary work.
Helmut Dubiel thus describes Horkheimer’s program as one of a combination of research
and ‘presentation’:
The Institute’s program in the early 1930s consisted of “interdisciplinary” social
research. [...] ...Horkheimer systematically claimed the function of presentation
for himself, while his colleagues were assigned the role of providing material
from the various disciplines.53
The ZfS was to serve as the organ for this network.

Materialism, Biology, and the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung

The founding of the ZfS represented an attempt to draw together these streams of
argument and scholarship through a differentiated understanding of materialism into a
productive synthesis of disciplinary inquiry, philosophical reflection, and engagement
with social problems. In the early years of the publication of the journal, especially 1932
and 1933, Horkheimer and his colleagues believed that natural scientific inquiry, and
especially that which had living systems as its object, remained fully within the intended
argument and inquiry) parallel and recapitulate central topoi of Horkheimer’s thought. Toulmin does not
explore Horkheimer or the Frankfurt School directly in his work, but the title of one of his recent books
evokes Horkheimer almost uncannily. Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001).
53
Dubiel, Theory and Politics, 126-27.

21

purview of the journal’s program.54 Horkheimer’s editorial choices, as well as his own
contributions to the ZfS, demonstrate this. His short introductory essay in the first
volume of the journal, entitled “Comments on Science and Crisis (Bemerkungen über
Wissenschaft und Krise),” is suffused with language linking the concepts of Leben,
Natur, Wissenschaft, and Gesellschaft. The very first paragraph raises all of the valences
of materialist understanding in one extended sentence about the relationship of science
and society:
It [science] makes the modern industrial system possible – as a condition, on
average, of the mobility of thought that has developed with it in the past decades;
further in the form of the simple insights about nature and the human world of
which even the members of the lower social layers in advanced nations take
notice; and not least as an element of the intellectual capital of the researchers,
whose discoveries decidedly have a say in the form of social life.55
Nature, human individuals, and societies together provide the basis for the knowledge
that generates and mediates the economic system. Horkheimer is fully aware, however,
that similar arguments could be advanced by scholars and political figures with violently
exclusionary, nationalist, and racist values. He thus immediately insists that although
scholarly inquiry remains an element within the historical and social world explored by
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the Institut, it must be pursued independently from specific social and political interests.
Furthermore, accessible and applicable standards of truth must guide such inquiry.
Horkheimer only lightly veils his judgment of the claims of the politically active
branches of biological thought like race biology and eugenics, for he engages their
rhetoric of life process (Lebensprozeß) and necessity to life (Lebenswichtigkeit) just a few
sentences later in the second paragraph of his essay:
It in no way justifies a pragmatic theory of knowledge that science plays a role as
a productive force and mode of production in the life process of society. [...] The
test of the truth of a judgment is something different from the test of its necessity
to life. No case exists where social interests must decide about truth. Rather
there are valid criteria that have developed in connection with the progress of
theory. Indeed science does itself change in the historical process, but never is a
reference to this change an argument for the application of other criteria of truth
than those that are adequate to the state of knowledge in the current stage of
development.56
Since this claim enables Horkheimer to set his project apart from immediate political
goals, he can explore the valences of materialism with greater leeway.57 Thus in the
remainder of his short essay he goes on first to dismiss mechanistic materialism, and then
to highlight how economic conditions and scholarly institutions and explanations move in
56
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parallel with one another, but must do so without the subordination of one to the other.
He sums this idea up as follows: “The theory of the correlation of cultural disorder with
economic conditions – and with the conflicts of interest that emerge from them – reveals
nothing about the degree of reality or the hierarchical relationship of material and
intellectual goods.”58 Horkheimer thus seeks means by which scholarly inquiry might be
prevented from devolving into yet another form of ideology, and finds it, at least
potentially, in an adequately sophisticated form of materialist thought. He is already
moving past the mechanistic-dialectical duality and toward the kind of multivalent,
interdisciplinary materialism that will characterize his Critical Theory of the later 1930s.
Horkheimer’s editorial policy in the first two years of the publication of the ZfS
sought to expand the purview of its predecessor publication, Grünbergs Archiv, beyond
the field of political economy. The work of scholars like Friedrich Pollock, Kurt
Baumann, and Henryk Grossmann helped the new journal retain its status as one of the
foremost academic organs of Marxist-oriented economic thought. Nonetheless the ZfS
did have an extraordinarily broad purview. Adorno published “On the Social Situation of
Music (Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik);” Leo Lowenthal wrote similarly “On the
Social Situation of Literature (Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur).” Julian
Gumperz analyzed the American political system. Erich Fromm contributed three
substantial articles on psychoanalysis and social psychology. Each of the first two
volumes of the journal also contained one article that focused particularly on the natural
scientific and biological embranchments of materialist thought. Both of these articles
highlighted the issue of the ideological loading of scientific inquiry through too great an
58
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emphasis on mechanistic or deterministic claims to total explanation of natural
phenomena.
The first volume of the ZfS contained a contribution by the Vienna sociologist
Franz Borkenau entitled “On the Sociology of the Mechanistic Representation of the
World (Zur Soziologie des mechanistischen Weltbildes).” Borkenau saw the proliferation
of a “mathematical-mechanistic representation of the world (mathematischmechanistisches Weltbild)” after 1620 as a thoroughgoing shift in European thought. In
Borkenau’s view, the influence of Descartes, Hobbes, and Gassendi led to complete
dominance of theories of knowledge by mathematically elaborated mechanistic models.
He further emphasizes that this development suffused both physical explanation and
social theory, and revealed their unity at the time: “In the origination process of modern
thought there exists – in the sharpest contrast to its further formation – no boundary
between metaphysics and the theory of knowledge on the once hand, and physics and
social theory on the other.”59 This unity drove the rapid development of industrial
manufacture. Nonetheless it also rapidly developed ideological character, and Borkenau
discusses the work of numerous thinkers including Althusius, Lipsius, and Hobbes as
ideologies. Interestingly, Borkenau does not describe what he sees as Pascal’s
“pessimistic” system of “negative dialectics [negative Dialektik]” as ideological. This is
because Pascal, despite being rooted in the social structures of his day, developed a new
approach to scientific inquiry: “He first subordinated, with extreme rigor, the formulation
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of natural laws to verification by experiment....”60 Pascal provides a necessary part of the
foundation for the kind of autonomously systematic and empirically rigorous inquiry into
natural and human phenomena to which materialist social research still aspires.
Borkenau thus establishes that mechanistic explanation, though inadequate as a theory of
knowledge, remains within the sphere of social research because it has accreted durable
social functions.
In the second volume of the ZfS, Paul Ludwig Landsberg contributed an article
that made clear the importance of a well argued response by materialist social theory to
one widely known but particularly problematical sphere of biological thought: race
theory. Landsberg’s title pulled no punches about the fundamental issue involved: “Race
Ideology and Race Science (Rassenideologie und Rassenwissenschaft).” Landsberg
develops his argument in the spirit of Horkheimer’s claims that despite the present danger
of ideological misrepresentation and misuse of the results of scholarly inquiry, such
inquiry can and must still aspire to truth. Furthermore, ideology itself clearly reveals the
socially embedded character of all knowledge, and therefore must be drawn into methods
of inquiry that seek knowledge as social truth. Landsberg thus draws a clear conceptual
distinction between science and ideology, but refuses to dismiss ideology as purely false
or manipulative:
It is of the greatest importance to differentiate in principle between race theory as
pure ideology and race theory as natural science. The sense in which the
questions of bourgeois natural science are not free from a guiding ideological
motive will be demonstrated, but also that the widest possible difference exists
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between those questions and actual race ideologies. As regards the concept of
ideology, we are far from making the ideologue equivalent to the fraud. The fact
that a theory can be designated an ideology indicates that both its origin and its
evidence are not based, for its adherents, on experiential content, but on a social
function, on an effect within society and its conflicts that is expected of it.61
The problem of the scientific and ideological use and misuse of the race concept also
points directly to the mutual implication of biological and sociological inquiry.
Landsberg argues that biology has in fact provided the foundation for important
developments in both sociology and philosophy:
The tremendous development of modern biology raised the problems of race with
new urgency, because it placed biological questions at the center even of
sociological discussion. In philosophy since Nietzsche it gave occasion to the
formation of biocentric representations of the world that have widely divergent
value, and of which the most important are that of Bergson, and at some interval
of niveau that of Klages.62
Landsberg’s conclusions about race biology develop the principles of Horkheimer’s
materialist social research into a detailed case study of a field in which the common
61
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historical and social roots of science, ideology and politics become particularly clear, and
which therefore provides at once a great challenge to and a powerful motivation for the
development of the methods and goals of the Institut and the ZfS.
Horkheimer himself chose a more philosophical approach to questions of
scholarly inquiry and social conflict in his fully developed scholarly contributions to the
early volumes of the ZfS. In two essays published in the second volume of the journal he
thoroughly explored the concept of materialism, and staked his claim to scholarship that
could be fully adequate to the political and social problems of the day. In “Materialism
and Metaphysics,” the lead article in volume two of the ZfS, Horkheimer develops most
systematically his argument that the mechanistic and dialectical valences of materialism
are in fact part of the same historical process, and thus must contribute together to a
productive system of inquiry that can advance the understanding of the world.
Furthermore, the identity of the two valences of materialism reveals historically and
demands methodologically that natural scientific and philosophical work be pursued with
unitary purpose. He begins with an argument that even opponents of materialism often
accept for its means of linking a unitary view of the world with the practical
consequences of human action:
Even if materialism appears so insufficient in contrast to other possible
summations of the whole of the world, its most general thesis – the one that
concerns the world in and of itself – is also taken up in combat against it as
fundamental for specific practical consequences, and so too for a unitary formal
arrangement of life....63
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He goes on to clarify the historical and intellectual roots of the apparent, but
philosophically meaningless, divide between the mechanistic and dialectical forms of
materialist thought. Martin Jay’s reading of this essay, which he calls “one of his
[Horkheimer’s] most important in the Zeitschrift,” focuses on how Horkheimer critiques
both “mechanical materialists” and “the putative materialism of orthodox Marxism.”64
Horkheimer develops his argument out of a claim that both Kant and Hegel attempted to
avoid materialist terms in the construction of their idealistic systems, but how both
thereby in fact further developed the grounding for materialism. He then sums up the
historical and philosophical result of these developments of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries in one of his most famously unambiguous and widely quoted
phrases: “Materialism demands the unification of philosophy and science.”65
The final third of Horkheimer’s essay must therefore address how and why his
multivalent materialism provides superior means of explanation to other synthetic modes
of inquiry. The other modes that challenge Horkheimer’s vision have a common thread,
as well. They are all biological. They thus claim to provide total explanations of life, its
determinants, and its consequences. He begins with the best known philosophical system
promulgated by a practicing academic biologist: Ernst Haeckel’s monism.
Because in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all of science rested upon the
mechanical theory of nature, and almost exhausted itself in it, the materialism of
the time allowed as valid knowledge of reality only mathematical-mechanical
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natural science. [...] The physical materialism of Vogt and Haeckel in the
nineteenth century had already practically given up striving for the unification of
philosophy and positive science, because in their time the mechanical theory of
nature in no way coincided any longer with the content of science, but had, rather,
lost significant contemporary meaning in relation to the social sciences. They had
also become decisive for methodology. The purely natural scientific monism of
Haeckel is therefore a pseudo-materialism, which also announces itself in its
function, by means of world-view, of distracting from historical praxis.66
Nineteenth century positivism, including the forms pursued by Comte and Mach, reveals
a similar failing: it refuses to recognize any historicity in the processes of scientific
inquiry. Positivism also, through its refusal to seek more than only explanations for the
observable appearances of natural and living phenomena, has no answer to superstitions
or to metaphysical and vitalistic speculations about souls and life forces.
In Horkheimer’s opinion, the two most widely read scholarly partisans of
biologistic philosophical thought after 1900, Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, lost
themselves entirely in the thickets of positivism’s failures. Bergson’s ‘élan vital’ and
Driesch’s extensively elaborated arguments for a vitalistic force guiding the development
of living organisms are thus both attempts to answer the unanswerable pseudo-problems
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of positivism.67 It comes as no surprise to Horkheimer that both Bergson and Driesch
(and even Comte before them) wound up tilting at spiritualistic and occult phenomena
and explanations.68 Horkheimer’s conclusion is unambiguous. “Neither ‘the mystical’
nor the ‘meaning of life’ exists.”69 He thus concludes that his multivalent materialism
more successfully addresses the full range of human phenomena and interests than its
biologically justified predecessors, because only it develops clear intellectual and
methodological means of explaining together both the physical and the economic aspects
of human life in their historical and present manifestations. His second essay in the
second volume of the ZfS, on “Materialism and the Moral (Materialismus und Moral),”
further develops his arguments by exploring their consequences for the ethical judgment
of human action.

Richard Thurnwald and the Biology of Society

Despite the interests in sophisticated explanations of social phenomena that
Horkheimer and Thurnwald had come to share by 1931, their personal histories and
processes of intellectual development were very different. Thurnwald achieved his
academic position, as professor of ethnology in Berlin, only circuitously. Thurnwald’s
early history, in fact, seems ready-made to have given him little tolerance for the opinions
of a young and ambitious left-oriented academic like Horkheimer. Born in 1869 in
Vienna, Thurnwald grew up in bourgeois surroundings, served for some time in the
67
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imperial Austro-Hungarian army, and earned a degree in law in 1895. As a civil servant
in Graz he met the sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz, who awakened his interest in
research on human societies. In 1900 he moved to Berlin to resume studies at the
university on ethnological topics. In 1901 he met Felix von Luschan, the director of the
Berlin Museum of Ethnology. By November of that year he had published his first
scholarly article on ancient Egypt, and had been appointed to a research assistantship at
the museum.70
Through his interest in the anti-alcohol movement, Thurnwald came into close
contact and association with a group of scholars and advocates who contributed more
than any other to the propagation of principles of race hygiene and eugenics in Germany.
The leading figure in the group was Alfred Ploetz, and together with Ernst Rüdin and
Anastasius Nordenholz, Ploetz and Thurnwald founded both the journal known as the
Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie (Archive for the Biology of Race and
Society; in 1904) and the Society for Race Hygiene (Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene; in
1905). Thurnwald contributed several articles to the early volumes of the journal, and
remained on its editorial board into the 1920s.71 He would later reject many of the
principles of race hygiene that the Archiv and the Gesellschaft had been instrumental in
propagating, but only after years of further study and his development, through years of
field research, into one of the founders of German field ethnology.72 In September 1906,
Thurnwald began his first ethnological research trip under the auspices of the Berlin
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museum, and it took him to a place he would spend many years: New Guinea. This first
journey, which also took him to Bougainville, pursued the collection of material objects
for the museum in Berlin. It lasted until September 1909, and included a visit to the
United States on the return trip to Germany.
By 1910, Thurnwald was questioning Luschan’s insistence on the systematic
collection of the objects of material culture as the museum’s main scientific pursuit, and
began planning another lengthy research trip to begin exploring methods of research
which could better explore the broad determinants of the social aspects of informant
groups through participatory methods of observation.73 In 1911 he gave a number of
major lectures at conferences that explained his new methodological ideas. In them he
extensively developed his claim that complex socio-cultural phenomena must be explored
as manifestations of historically rooted psychologies that have biological determinants.
At the first meeting of the International Organization for Comparative Law and
Economics (Internationale Vereinigung für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und
Volkswirtschaftslehre), he phrased it this way:
It appears to me to be generally more important, and at the same time more
practically productive, to ask after the branching geographical, biological, and
economic conditions for the formation of a specific mode of thought and the
conventions and institutions that accrete to it, and then to approach the basic
problems of ethnographic studies from this side.74
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At the 83rd meeting of the Association of German Naturalists and Physicians
(Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte) in Karlsruhe, he emphasized the
biological element in his methods. He sought, “on the basis of biology,... to grasp
cultural inquiry with the natural-scientific spirit of exact psychology.”75 He embarked on
his second research journey in December 1912, and he would not return to Berlin until
May 1917, after adventures including an English-Australian navy campaign against his
‘position’ in New Guinea in early 1915 and over a year as a guest researcher at the
University of California in Berkeley during 1916 and 1917. 1918 saw Thurnwald
fighting for several months on the Western Front in France.
In 1919, in view of his numerous and well-respected publications, the University
of Halle granted him the Habilitation in ethnology. In 1922 he received a second
Habilitation from Berlin, where he was able to continue his career after 1923. In 1925 he
was given the honorary title of professor, but without a civil service salary or chair as
Ordinarius. In this period he worked with numerous journals, published widely, and
served as the founding editor of the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie,
which was published from 1925 to 1933 under his leadership.76 In his programmatic lead
article in the first volume of the journal Thurnwald returned to the language of his 1911
lectures, and emphasized the complex disciplinary status and structure of his scholarly
goals in a way that would have been familiar to Horkheimer. Biology once again arose
as a significant moment of disciplinary overlap:
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Social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) and sociology are concepts contested in
their meaning and interpretation. In any case, there are other areas of knowledge
that are already valued today as recognized and settled in which concepts are not
sharply bounded. In geography and biology, and fully in political economy
(Nationalökonomie), the boundary regions take up broad swaths, even when it is
specifically in these disciplines that the nucleus has clearly crystallized.77
Thurnwald’s chosen disciplinary designations have a much in common with
Horkheimer’s multivalent materialism. The one element they do not share is
Horkheimer’s interest in the philosophical grounding of disciplinary inquiry. They did
share a sense that their careers were stagnating in the atmosphere of economic, political,
and academic crisis in early 1930s Germany, and sought opportunities to expand their
activities beyond German borders. In 1930 and 1931 Thurnwald pursued further field
research in Africa. In 1931-32 he was visiting professor at Yale. After a year in a cabin
in the Adirondacks, a further research trip to New Guinea, six months in Australia, a
short return to Berlin, and another year (1935-36) at Yale, Thurnwald found himself with
no choice but to return to Berlin, for at age 67 he was too old to hold an American
professorship during an economic depression and in an age of mandatory retirement laws.
After years of deprivation during the war, he was made Ordinarius at the refounded
Humboldt-Universität in July 1946. He had little patience with academic life in the
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Soviet zone of occupation, however, and participated in the founding of the Freie
Universität Berlin in 1948. He died in 1954.
Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, Thurnwald’s student and the managing editor of
Sociologus/ZVS in the period of the disagreement with Horkheimer, also had a colorful
career. Mühlmann, like Thurnwald, started his career in eugenic and race biology circles,
and had been a student not only of Thurnwald but also of three of the leading luminaries
of German race science in the 1920s and 1930s: Eugen Fischer, the investigator of race
mixing in German South-West Africa, in Freiburg and Berlin; Walter Scheidt, the
partisan of “cultural biology (Kulturbiologie),” in Hamburg; and Fritz Lenz, the (firstever) professor of race hygiene and propagandist of racial ‘values’ in Munich.78 During
the Nazi period Mühlmann participated in several Nazi ethnographic and sociological
research initiatives in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless he was
denazified without difficulty after the war, and went on to professorships in Mainz and
Heidelberg, where he became the focus of controversy in the late 1960s for his
complicity in Nazi race research.79

Horkheimer, Thurnwald, and the Biological Politics of Social Research

The problem of the disciplinary status of biology in social research was the
intellectual issue at the core of the conflict between Horkheimer and Thurnwald. Two
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moments of institutional friction with personal consequences sparked it, however. The
first of these was the competition that the ZfS presented to Sociologus/ZVS. By January
1933 Sociologus/ZVS had German, American, English, and Dutch sociologists,
anthropologists, and biologists on its editorial board, including Friedrich Alverdes,
Edward Sapir, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Pitirim Sorokin.80 It was therefore similar to
the ZfS in its claims to international, cross- and interdisciplinary interests. The ZfS and
Sociologus/ZVS further shared the same publisher, C. L. Hirschfeld in Leipzig, which
intensified Thurnwald’s and Mühlmann’s concerns that the ZfS represented competition
to their journal rather than a mutually reinforcing enterprise. The second reason for
Thurnwald’s skepticism toward Horkheimer was the association of the Institut and its
forms of materialist thought and theory with Marxism, which Thurnwald treated with
generalized scorn. Thurnwald’s association with race biology and eugenics had colored
his early politics, but by the early 1930s he had found his way to a kind of liberal
internationalism. Both Thurnwald and Mühlmann regarded Horkheimer as an
opportunist. Nonetheless their own academic relationship was not without sources of
conflict. Their mutual criticism of Horkheimer’s goals and politics between 1931 and
1933 ignited a series of their own personal and academic disagreements over the
intellectual and scientific status of race biology that further demonstrates how the
disciplinary instability of biology made itself felt in many areas of social research.
The initial document of the interaction between Horkheimer, Thurnwald, and
Mühlmann gives evidence of how Horkheimer himself highlighted the interdisciplinary
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nature of his plans for the ZfS to other scholars. This document is a letter from
Mühlmann (in Berlin) to Thurnwald (in New Haven), dated 30 October 1931. In it,
Mühlmann recounts receiving a first letter from Horkheimer a few days before in which
Horkheimer, apparently in Berlin at the time, asked to see Thurnwald.81 Upon learning
that this was impossible, Horkheimer spoke at length with Mühlmann, apparently in
person, about his plans. Mühlmann describes Horkheimer’s presentation of his plans for
the ZfS as follows:
At that point I gave him an interview, in which I learned the following: the
aforementioned Frankfurt institute plans to publish an (institutional) journal,
“Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,” that is supposed to appear first at the beginning
of next year. It is supposed to make political economy (Nationalökonomie),
biology, psychology, social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) “fruitful” for social
research (Sozialforschung). The reason that Herr Prof. Horkheimer imparted
these things to me was, firstly, that he – as he expressed it to me – felt the need to
discuss the planned founding [of the journal] with a specialist; for twenty minutes
he took me for your temporary replacement at the university. Secondly, the
gentleman wanted our and your help.82
Horkheimer thus raises the same set of mediating disciplines, psychology and biology,
that linked his concept of Sozialforschung as multivalent materialism to other academic
81
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structures – and were also precisely those boundary disciplines with which Thurnwald
was most concerned. Mühlmann was distinctly skeptical of Horkheimer’s intent,
immediately scoffing that: “All of it was a completely clumsy attempt to lead me on, and
still today I am shocked that one takes us for so boundlessly stupid as to work for the
competition.”83 Mühlmann further indicates that Horkheimer sent him a letter of
confirmation of their discussion, on ZfS letterhead. Thurnwald wrote back to Mühlmann
on 14 November 1931 with a somewhat more sanguine opinion of Horkheimer’s intent,
indicating that he considered Horkheimer’s intentions to be just another example of
misplaced “industriousness (Betriebsamkeit).”84 These two letters further demonstrate
how Thurnwald and Mühlmann approached biology as a foundational disciplinary
element in sociology, for they discuss at some length the idea of including a section of
book reviews in the December issue of Sociologus/ZVS under the rubric “Biological
Foundations of Sociology (Biologische Grundlagen der Soziologie).”
Mühlmann’s next letter to Thurnwald, dated 29 November 1931, is an important
document of the biologically structured thought of a major young ethnologist of the
period. Mühlmann and Thurnwald thought similarly about many things, but Mühlmann,
though he was younger, saw race as a much more significant category of inquiry than did
Thurnwald. In his letter, Mühlmann writes at length about why he is less skeptical of
“value theory (Werttheorie)” than Thurnwald, and why he sees Darwinism as the grounds
for arguments that evolutionary claims about human diversity can justify theories of
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value.85 In doing so he raises a category that was also fundamental to Horkheimer and
his Institut colleagues at this point, and thus further helps to explain why Thurnwald and
Mühlmann were resistant to Horkheimer’s arguments: Praxis. Mühlmann reminds
Thurnwald that:
You yourself want to reach out from sociology into praxis. Praxis, however, is
decidedly not self-evident. [...] For my part, therefore, praxis is so entirely not
self-evident because my thought is decisively determined by racial hygiene; and
in the light of racial hygiene some measure of today’s praxis, for example in
social welfare, appears considerably questionable.86
Mühlmann thus reveals that his primary intellectual allegiance is to his training in race
biology and race hygiene.
Thurnwald responded on 21 December 1931 with a lengthy discussion of his
hard-earned skepticism about race biology. He himself had been a major figure in early
German race biology and eugenics, but he had become publicly critical of their methods
and goals after the First World War. By 1925, Thurnwald believed that race biology was
an inadequate means of understanding human diversity. He had come to see the field’s
vulgar evolutionism as conflating culture and taxonomy through the loose concept of
race. Thurnwald extensively critiqued race biology in the 1920s and 1930s, and
developed a theory of sifting (Siebung) as a counterpoint to what he saw to be all-tooloose analogies to Darwinian selection in the race biologists’ approach to processes of
85
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cultural change. In 1924 he published a lengthy article entitled “On the Critique of the
Biology of Society (Zur Kritik der Gesellschaftsbiologie)” in Werner Sombart’s Archiv
für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Archive for Social Science and Social Policy).87
Thurnwald believed that biological phenomena were of crucial importance to
ethnological and sociological methods, but he insisted in this article that the latter fields
must not be collapsed into biology through all-too-facile borrowing:
Several concepts that recur in discussions of the biology of society deserve to be
thought through critically. In many cases these concepts have been transferred
from zoology or biology onto human conditions of sociability. Such carryover of
a concept from one area of application to another brings easily with it, however,
displacement of relationships, lack of clarity, and then failure of communication
in discussion.88
This personal history of increasing distance to the claims of race biology colors his
response to Mühlmann:
Now then, as regards your assertions about values, I set myself against that
“overvaluing” of values that has become common in Germany…. I know that
strict “objectivity” is not possible, least of all in the sociological field. But there
are levels and degrees of subjectivity. […] As regards racial hygiene, you
87
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probably know that I too came through this childhood disease. Most race
hygienists are however, as you yourself insinuate, so divorced from society, and
therefore so divorced from life, that one would like to weep.89
Thurnwald goes on to discuss at length the potential misunderstandings that arise because
sociology and biology can make use of the same terms of analysis. He specifically
explains to Mühlmann how this problem affects his use of the term Siebung, and further
why he expressly avoids the term Rasse: “Should you address the confusion in thought
that is bound up with the word ‘race,’ then that will all be very nice. But specifically
because great confusion reigns, I chose a different expression.”90 For Thurnwald in 1931,
race is no longer a term that has useful explanatory content either in sociology or in
biology.
In early 1932, Horkheimer and the ZfS again appear in the correspondence, and
biology is again the moment of contention. On 20 February 1932, Mühlmann reported
receiving the publisher’s prospectus for the ZfS:
The enclosed prospectus from our “competition” will interest you. The first
volume has not yet been published. I have to write the publisher a few stern
words about this, its newest child, especially since I bugled the charge so
powerfully in the autumn. The preface represents approximately the things that
Prof. Horkheimer brought to my attention at the time. At that time, however, he
89
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spoke of “making fruitful” economics, history, psychology, and biology. This
time biology is missing! That proves to me that Mr. Horkheimer came to me then
with quite specific and individually tailored intentions. “Biology” was supposed
to be bait that would get me to talk.91
Mühlmann thus believes that Horkheimer was not, in fact, interested in biology as a
disciplinary problem, but rather only that Horkheimer used the term as a red herring to
get his attention. He thus underestimates Horkheimer’s motivations for including biology
in the range of disciplines addressed by the ZfS. Thurnwald responded on 2 March 1932,
acceding to Mühlmann’s adversarial reading with a comment that: “The journal is clearly
a competitive undertaking, as I see.” For Thurnwald, however, it is not the disciplinary
issues raised by Mühlmann that best explain his own animosity. Rather it is the Marxist
orientation of Horkheimer and his colleagues: “But we have the bilingual form as an
advantage, and perhaps a few ideas. The others clearly bore away at Marxism, which
they disguise.”92
Horkheimer’s early scholarship indicates that he was well aware of the many and
complex valences of the term biology, and of the ongoing debates in sociology,
psychology, and philosophy about biology’s status as a foundational discipline.
Nonetheless the way that biology arises selectively in Horkheimer’s language emerges
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Mühlmann to Thurnwald, 20 February 1932, 2-3. “Der beiliegende Prospekt unserer ‘Konkurrenz’ wird
Sie interessieren. Das erste Heft ist noch nicht erschienen. Ich muss dem Verlag noch ein paar
verbindliche Worte über dies sein neuestes Kind schreiben, schon weil ich im Herbst so heftig zum Kampf
geblasen habe. Das Vorwort entspricht ungefähr dem, was mir Herr Prof. Horkheimer seinerzeit zu
verstehen gab. Damals sprach er allerdings von einem “Fruchtbarmachen” der Ökonomik, Geschichte,
Psychologie und Biologie. Diesmal fehlt die Biologie! Das beweist mir, dass Herr Horkheimer damals mit
ganz bestimmten, auf mich eingestellten Absichten hierherkam. ‘Biologie’ sollte ein ein [sic] Köder sein,
der mich gesprächig machen sollte.” Emphasis original.
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Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 2 March 1932, 2. “Die Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung ist deutlich eine
Konkurrenzunternehmung, wie ich sehe. [...] Aber wir haben die Zweisprachigkeit voraus, und vielleicht
einige Ideen. Die anderen bohren natürlich im Marxismus, was sie verschleiern.”
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from its potential, but never clearly defined, overlap with his concept of multivalent
materialism as research method and model of scholarship. Horkheimer never did
programmatically define the relationship between biology and his goals for the ZfS and
the Institut. Rather, he recognized biology’s qualities as a negative disciplinary concept
that itself required elucidation. He also realized that the qualities of his own multivalent
materialism could be clarified through the exploration of some of the issues of biological
disciplinarity. Nonetheless he always addressed the problem through the lens of
philosophy. Thurnwald and Mühlmann misunderstood Horkheimer’s goals because they
read his arguments as pointing primarily to the Marxist-inflected dialectical of
materialism, rather than to the mechanistic valence prominent in the natural sciences.
Horkheimer’s first letter to Thurnwald is dated 6 August 1932. It is brief, but is
written in a collegial tone. Horkheimer explains that he had been seriously ill for several
months – a situation that is also explained in a footnote to his introductory essay
published in the first volume of the ZfS – and that his illness, combined with Thurnwald’s
absence from Berlin, delayed his intended visit to Thurnwald. He succinctly explains his
goals for the ZfS and its multi-disciplinary approach:
I hope that the goals of the journal will not be unsympathetic to you. The
essential point consists of concentrating the results of various branches of
knowledge more decidedly on the problem of contemporary society than has
taken place up to now.93
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Horkheimer to Thurnwald, 6 August 1932, 1. ‘Ich hoffe, dass Ihnen die Ziele der Zeitschrift nicht
unsympathisch sein mögen. Ein Wesentliches besteht darin, die Ergebnisse verschiedener Wissenszweige
noch entscheidender auf das Problem der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft zu konzentrieren, als es bisher
geschehen ist.’
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Horkheimer still hopes to be able to visit Thurnwald personally, and to suggest to him
that he collaborate with the ZfS.
Thurnwald apparently received Horkheimer’s letter promptly, although
Horkheimer had addressed it to Berlin. Thurnwald was at the time residing in Big Shanty
Camp, North River, Warren County, New York, where mail from Berlin was rapidly
forwarded to him via New Haven. He had clearly accepted Mühlmann’s negative reading
of Horkheimer’s intent by this time. On 29 August 1932, he revealed this in a letter to
Wilhelm Kohlhammer, whose Stuttgart publishing house was a subsidiary firm of C. L.
Hirschfeld in Leipzig, and who apparently had substantial administrative authority over
scholarly journals published under the Hirschfeld imprint. Thurnwald expresses
displeasure at both the competition to Sociologus/ZVS that the ZfS represents, and also at
Horkheimer’s Marxism:
All of the addresses and contacts that I imparted to Hirschfeld publishers over the
years are now being exploited to propagate the competition to Sociologus. Mr.
Horkheimer and his minions have succeeded in talking the representatives of
Hirschfeld publishers into the idea that the new journal is no competition, and that
Sociologus has to limit itself to social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) while Mr.
Horkheimer taps true sociology (namely Marxist). It is not enough that Mr.
Horkheimer thereby imitates the organization of Sociologus (even if pathetically)
– in places he takes over our words almost verbatim. That does not demonstrate
quick-wittedness, but rather only “machinations (Mache).” […] When Mr.
Horkheimer says that he concentrates the results of various branches of
knowledge more decidedly on the problem of contemporary society than has been
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the case up to now, he overlooks the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und
Soziologie.94
Thurnwald goes on to express to Kohlhammer praise for Mühlmann’s skepticism about
Horkheimer’s intentions. On 4 September 1932 he then wrote to Mühlmann personally,
repeating his negative opinion of Horkheimer’s intentions and Marxist political views,
and again praising Mühlmann for his skepticism. He ironically tells Mühlmann that
should Horkheimer’s intended visit to him in Berlin actually come to pass, then he is
“truly not at home (wahrlich nicht zu Hause).”95 The letter indicates, however, that it
was not out of personal investment in the capitalist economic order that Thurnwald drew
his disdain for Horkheimer and his plans. He reports to Mühlmann his belief that the
United States, in the depths of the Great Depression, is in a period of “cultural overhaul,”
in which “the old varnish of capitalist swindles, bribes, and the like is beginning to be
morally devalued.”96 At this point, Mühlmann’s thoroughly negative opinion had carried
the day.
Kohlhammer did not share Thurnwald’s displeasure with Horkheimer and the ZfS.
He wrote Thurnwald on 19 September 1932, drawing a response from Thurnwald on 3
October 1932 in which Thurnwald reiterated his negative opinion. He dismisses
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Thurnwald to Kohlhammer, 29 August 1932, 1. “…[A]lle meine im Laufe der Jahre dem Verlag
Hirschfeld mitgeteilten Adressen und Winke werden jetzt benutzt, um die Konkurrenz von SOCIOLOGUS
zu propagieren. Es ist Herrn Horkheimer und seinem Gefolge geglückt, den Vertreter des Verlages
Hirschfeld einzureden, dass die neue Zeitschrift keine Konkurrenz ist, dass ‘Sociologus’ sich auf
‘Völkerpsychologie’ zu beschränken habe, während Herr Horkheimer die echte Soziologie (Nämlich die
marxistische) verzapft. Nicht genug damit imitiert Herr Horkheimer den SOCIOLOGUS in der Einteilung
(wenn auch kläglich) und stellenweise nimmt er fast wörtlich die Worte von uns über. Das zeigt nicht von
Scharfsinn, sondern nur von „Mache”. [...] Wenn Herr Horkheimer sagt, dass er die Ergebniss [sic]
verschiedener Wissenszweige besser auf das Problem der Gesellschaft konzentriert, als bisher der Fall war,
so übersieht er die Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie.”
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Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 4 September 1932, 1.
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Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 4 September 1932, 1. “Kulturüberholung… der alte Firnis kapitalistischer
Schwindeleien, Bestechungen u.dgl. beginnt moralisch entwertet zu werden.”
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Kohlhammer’s suggestion that his fears are only “seeing the worst (Schwarzsehen).”97
Kohlhammer then discussed the issue with Horkheimer directly, who took the discussion
as the basis for a long two-page letter to Thurnwald on 7 November 1932. After initial
niceties about his respect for Thurnwald’s “scholarly achievement (wissenschaftliche
Leistung),” and his surprise at Thurnwald’s concerns about competition between their
journals, Horkheimer explains that he had, in fact, wished to retain Grünberg’s title for
the Institut’s journal, but that Grünberg himself had insisted on a name change.
Horkheimer thus chose a name for the journal that paralleled the name of the Institut:
“That we then chose a title that corresponds with the name of our institute was certainly
the obvious thing.”98 He goes on to explain that the ZfS intends to concentrate its
editorial policy on work by members of the Institut. Thurnwald’s concerns that the ZfS
represents competition should thus, in time, clearly be allayed. Horkheimer concludes
with a paragraph reiterating his surprise and disappointment at Thurnwald’s misgivings.
He recalls his earlier plan to visit Thurnwald personally and to request his assistance:
How little I anticipated that the publication of our journal could displease you
might also come to light in my desire last year to visit you, along with other
interested colleagues. This was in order to request that you inform us of
appropriate works in your discipline that bear consideration for a review in our
journal. It should pain me greatly if your concerns – which are most decidedly
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Thurnwald to Kohlhammer, 3 October 1932, 1.
Horkheimer to Thurnwald, 7 November 1932, 1. “Dass wir dann einen Titel gewählt haben, der mir
dem Namen unseres Instituts übereinstimmt, war doch gewiss das Nächstliegende.”
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unfounded – prevented the development of the relationship between both journals
into one of fruitful mutual supplementation.99
Horkheimer clearly had no intention of allowing Thurnwald’s concerns to damage the
publication prospects of the ZfS, but he just as clearly hoped to apply his considerable
reserves of administrative talent, diplomacy, and charm to manage successfully his
relations with an important academic colleague.
Thurnwald realized at this point that Horkheimer’s attitude, combined with
Kohlhammer’s general support for the ZfS, meant that he had little chance of preventing
the publication of the ZfS by C. L. Hirschfeld. He responded to Horkheimer on 15
December 1932 with a very short letter that gives no indication of the dissatisfaction that
he had voiced vigorously to Mühlmann and Kohlhammer. He had apparently resigned
himself to the publication of the ZfS, and saw no reason to continue to treat Horkheimer
uncollegially by ignoring his letters. He thus takes the civil path opened by Horkheimer.
He reworks Horkheimer’s own words about his hopes for a mutually productive
enterprise: “I too nurture the sincere wish that both journals might supplement each
other.”100 Horkheimer responded, concisely but cordially, on 28 January 1933. He
thanks Thurnwald for his thoughts, and expresses hope that they will have the chance to
meet personally once Thurnwald returns to Germany. Given the political situation of the
moment, however, there was little immediate prospect of such a meeting, and the
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Horkheimer to Thurnwald, 7 November 1932, 2. “Wie wenig ich bis heute geahnt hatte, dass Ihnen das
Erscheinen unserer Zeitschrift missfallen könnte, mag auch daraus hervorgehen, dass ich Sie letztes Jahr,
wie einige andere interessierte Kollegen, besuchen wollte, um Sie zu bitten, uns jeweils die Arbeiten aus
Ihrem Fach, welche für eine Besprechung in unserer Zeitschrift in Betracht kommen, mitzuteilen. Es sollte
mir aufrichtig leid tun, wenn Ihre Bedenken, die ganz entschieden unberechtigt sind, es verhinderten, dass
sich das Verhältnis der beiden Zeitschriften zu dem einer wissenschaftlich fruchtbaren gegenseitigen
Ergänzung ausbildete.”
100
Thurnwald to Horkheimer, 15 December 1932. “Auch ich hege den aufrichtigen Wunsch, dass sich
beide Zeitschriften ergänzen mögen.”

48

correspondence therefore breaks off here. There is no indication in the Thurnwald papers
or in the Horkheimer-Pollock Archive of any direct personal contact or correspondence
between Horkheimer and Thurnwald after this final letter.

National Socialism, Race Biology, and Social Research

Thurnwald’s relationship with Mühlmann took a somewhat rougher turn at just
this time, however. Almost a year before, they had discussed the methods and goals of
race biology and race hygiene, and Mühlmann had felt it necessary to defend his own
training in and advocacy for race biology. Now, after Thurnwald had at first accepted
Mühlmann’s negative reading of Horkheimer’s intentions but then realized that he would
not be able to thwart them, the issue of Mühlmann’s investment in race biology became
an opportunity for Thurnwald to reestablish his authority as the senior scholar in their
working relationship through a renewed critique of race biology. The immediate political
stakes of the National Socialist appropriation of race biology further inflect his
comments. Remarkably, Horkheimer and his Institut colleagues remained a present
element in this conflict. Horkheimer’s own assertion of the importance of biology for the
Institut and ZfS meant that when biological fields and terms became a moment of
contention in the collaboration between Thurnwald and Mühlmann, they could use him
and their mutually expressed disdain for him as a means of deflecting some of the
personal friction of their own intellectual conflict. Horkheimer thus remained a source of
derision in Thurnwald’s and Mühlmann’s correspondence for some months after he was
no longer in direct contact with either of them.
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The proximate cause of their disagreement was an unspecified article manuscript
by Walter Scheidt, Mühlmann’s teacher in Hamburg, that Mühlmann had forwarded to
Thurnwald in New York State. On 15 December 1932, the same day he wrote his letter
to Horkheimer, Thurnwald informed Mühlmann of his receipt of the Scheidt manuscript.
Only one week later, on 22 December 1932, Thurnwald wrote Mühlmann again with an
extensive and thoroughgoing critique of Scheidt’s ideas and methods. Thurnwald finds
the essay to be nothing more than “juggling with slogans (Herumjonglieren mit
Schlagworten).” He reiterates his own sympathy for biological thinking, but finds
Scheidt’s work – work that included a 1930 monograph on Kulturbiologie – to be nothing
of the sort: “As you know, my stance toward biological points of view is very
sympathetic. For that very reason this work appears to be inadequate to me.”101 He even
criticizes general trends in German scholarship by associating them with Scheidt’s selfimportant style: “Everything is excessively ambitiously puffed up: ‘Nonsense, nonsense’
etc., then the underlining of entire paragraphs. Those are psychological indications for
the immense – but in Germany impressive – self-overestimation of Mr. Scheidt.”102 He
then hints that Scheidt would find a better home in competing journals. While he does
not mention the ZfS by name, his derisory recommendation that Scheidt send his
“delectable fruits (köstlichen Früchte)” to the “competition (Konkurrenz)” must be
understood, in the context of past and future comments and of the conflict with
Horkheimer over the previous months, as a veiled reference to the Frankfurt project.103
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Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 22 December 1932, 1. “Ich stehe persönlich, wie Sie wissen, den
biologischen Standpunkten sehr sympathisch gegenüber. Gerade darum aber scheint mir diese Arbeit
unzureichend.”
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Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 22 December 1932, 1. “Alles ist ungeheuer anspruchsvoll aufplustert:
‘Unsinn’, ‘Unsinn’, etc. dann Unterstreichungen über ganze Absätze hin. Das sind psychologische Indizien
für die ungeheuere, aber in Deutschland imponierende, Selbstüberschätzung Herrn Scheidt’s.”
103
Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 22 December 1932, 2.

50

Mühlmann responded on 7 January 1933, regretting that he would therefore have to reject
Scheidt’s article, and fearing that this rejection would precipitate a break with Scheidt
and his colleagues in Hamburg. Thurnwald responded sympathetically on 20 January
1933, but reiterated his sweeping condemnation of Scheidt’s methods and results:
“Science exists not by ‘belief’ but by ‘proof.’ That is what is misjudged here [in
Germany]. Thus the collapse of German science.”104 Thurnwald and Mühlmann
continued to discuss this matter in several more letters, and as their discussion
progressed, it became more and more significantly focused on Scheidt’s claim to be
doing ‘biological anthropology’ or ‘Kulturbiologie.’ Thurnwald explained his opinion
most thoroughly in a lengthy letter to Mühlmann on 3 February 1933, in which he noted
that although he had found Scheidt’s early ethnological work interesting, “his theoretical
works are powerfully misguided.”105
Both Thurnwald’s opinion and Mühlmann’s fears of Scheidt’s response to the
rejection of his article were apparently well founded, for in 1935, Mühlmann sought his
Habilitation in Hamburg with a manuscript on “State Formation and Amphictyonies in
Polynesia (Staatsbildung und Amphyktionien in Polynesien).” Of the four readers of
Mühlmann’s manuscript, only Scheidt evaluated the work negatively. Ute Michel
describes Scheidt’s intellectual and political justifications for his rejection. The similarity
of her paraphrase of Scheidt’s reasons for rejection bears enough similarity to
Thurnwald’s disdain for Scheidt’s work and methods to raise the possibility that Scheidt
was retaliating for Mühlmann’s accession to Thurnwald’s criticisms. Nonetheless the
political realities of 1935 surely played an even more significant role, and despite
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Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 20 January 1933, 2. “Wissenschaft besteht nicht in ‘Glauben’, sondern in
‘Beweis’. Das verkennt man bei uns. Darum der Verfall der deutschen Wissenschaft.”
105
Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 3 February 1933, 7. “...seine theoretischen Arbeiten hauen scharf daneben.”
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Mühlmann’s widely expressed support for National Socialism, Scheidt accused him of
endangering the political rectitude of the younger academic generation:
Scheidt justifies his judgment with the argument that Mühlmann had distanced
himself from a solid, scholarly mode of work, and thus might, with his teaching
and research, lead parts of the academic youth down paths leading away from the
National Socialist state.106
The Nazi system’s incentivization of political denunciation as a means to academic and
professional prestige – sometimes especially among individuals who were apparently
strongly committed to the success of the party – was already well developed by this time.
Remarkably, as the Nazis consolidated their power in Germany in early 1933,
Horkheimer’s behavior remained a point of reference between Thurnwald and
Mühlmann, and they associated what they perceived to be Horkheimer’s scholarly
opportunism with the Nazis’ political behavior. On 2 April 1933, Thurnwald wrote to
Mühlmann and included some lengthy political rumination on his ambivalence about the
rise of the Nazis. “I always fear German ‘enthusiasm,’” he wrote, indicating disdain for
the events of 1914, 1918/1919, and 1933. And about Horkheimer, he asked snidely:
“How is our marxistic competition digesting the new regime? Have the people become
Nazis?”107 With this reiteration of Thurnwald’s derisory opinion of what he perceived to
be Horkheimer’s opportunistic stance, the controversy dissipated into the clouds of
political uncertainty that had overtaken Europe.
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Michel 77. “Sein Urteil begründet Scheidt damit, daß sich Mühlmann von solider wissenschaftlicher
Arbeitsweise entfernt habe und nun mit seiner Lehre und Forschung Teile der akademischen Jugend auf
vom nationalsozialistischen Staat abführende Wege leiten könnte.”
107
Thurnwald to Mühlmann, 2 April 1933, 2, 4. “Ich fürchte immer die deutsche ‘Begeisterung’. [...] Wie
bekommt unserer marzistischen [sic] Konkurrenz das neue Regime? Sind die Leute Nazis geworden?”
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Despite Thurnwald’s distinctly negative opinion in early 1933, Horkheimer
appears to have retained his positive regard for Thurnwald’s work and career, though
perhaps with some irony about Thurnwald’s generally conservative political views.
Upon Thurnwald’s death in 1954, Horkheimer wrote a traditional letter of condolence to
his widow, Hilde Thurnwald. His condolences were expressed in a tone appropriate to
Thurnwald’s political reputation, with doubtlessly conscious military metaphor: “With
Dr. Richard Thurnwald a human being has again departed who dedicated his life to
scholarship and fought in an advance position. I will honor his memory.”108 Hilde took
over the editorship of the revived Sociologus after her husband’s death, and corresponded
a few times with Horkheimer about editorial questions like choosing qualified book
reviewers.
Mühlmann also reestablished a working relationship with Horkheimer after the
war. He twice turned to Horkheimer in the 1950s and 1960s for support during
controversies. The first of these controversies is revealing: in it, Mühlmann resigned
from the editorial board of Homo, the journal of the German Society for Anthropology
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Anthropologie). He had sought to publish a review of a book
by the formerly Nazi-affiliated race theorist Hans F. K. Günther entitled Gattenwahl zu
ehelichem Glück und erblicher Ertüchtigung (Spousal Choice for Marital Happiness and
Hereditary Strengthening; Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1951), which was a new
edition of a book originally published in 1940. In his review Mühlmann sought to draw
attention cryptically to what he claimed were the “depredations” that “these ideas called
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Horkheimer to Hilde Thurnwald, 26 January 1954, Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main
[III, 13, 62]. “Mit Dr. Richard Thurnwald ist wieder ein Mensch dahingegangen, der sein Leben der
Wissenschaft verschrieben hatte und auf Außenposten kämpfte. Ich werde sein Andenken in Ehren
halten.”
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forth in Germany only a few years ago.”109 The editor-in-chief of Homo, the
anthropologist Egon von Eickstedt, twice asked him to moderate this allusion, and
Mühlmann resisted. Given that neither Günther nor Mühlmann had been punished,
imprisoned, or banned from academic work for their Nazi affiliations, and that both had
rapidly and successfully reestablished their careers in West Germany after the war, this
episode represents Mühlmann’s desire to distance himself from his own complicity in
Nazi policies and crimes. Ute Michel emphasizes how Mühlmann’s sought consistently
after the war to highlight his own lack of responsibility in her detailed critical resume of
his career.110 That Mühlmann had even testified as a witness for the defense in Günther’s
denazification trial in 1947 redoubles the evidence for this self-exculpatory motivation.111
There is no evidence that Horkheimer responded to Mühlmann’s 1952 letter.
Nonetheless, there is also no evidence that Horkheimer himself doubted or questioned
Mühlmann’s scholarly motivations, for in a further controversy from 1960 about the
doctoral curriculum in Soziologie at Heidelberg, Horkheimer lent personal support to
Mühlmann’s insistence that history not be deemphasized as a required companion
discipline.112 After this, however, there is no evidence of scholarly contact between
them.

Conclusion: Biology as Boundary Condition
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Mühlmann to “die Mitherausgeber von HOMO sowie einige andere anthropologische Fachkollegen,”
20 August 1952, Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main [III, 10, 303]. “Verheerungen...diese
Ideen noch vor wenigen Jahren in Deutschland hervorgerufen haben.”
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Horkheimer to Mühlmann, 17 July 1960, Horkheimer-Pollock Archiv, Frankfurt am Main [III, 27, 2324].
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As Horkheimer developed the principles of Critical Theory in the mid-1930s, the
stakes of these questions and disciplinary boundary zones did not dissipate. The most
important place where biology arises in his widely disseminated essays from this period
is found in the 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory (Traditionelle und kritische
Theorie).”113 In it Horkheimer outlines the principles of a kind of inquiry that, growing
out of the ‘interdisciplinary materialism’ of the early 1930s, might avoid the tendency for
theoretical work on social relations to become captured and made unproductive by its
own vested interests in disciplinary and institutional power. After Horkheimer has
sketched the character of critical theory as inquiry that embeds an understanding of its
own social position and disciplinary power into its methods, he addresses potential
arguments against the uniqueness of his proposed mode of critical thought. It is
specifically biology, the science that straddles the physico-chemical and the socialbehavioral, for which critical theory might be most easily mistaken:
The necessity that dominates society could in this sense be seen as biological, and
the special character of critical theory could thus be doubted, because in biology,
as in other natural sciences, individual processes are theoretically construed in a
similar way as happens in the critical theory of society, according to the
explanation above.114
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Two of Horkheimer’s essays from 1935 and 1936 on “philosophical anthropology” address his
developing views of biology as well: “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie,” ZfS 4 (1935),
and “Egoismus und Freheitsbewegung (Zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters),” ZfS 5 (1936). See:
Pierson, Leaving Marxism, 101-2.
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Max Horkheimer, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” Traditionelle und kritische Theorie: Vier
Aufsätze (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970) 45. Originally in ZfS 6 (1937). “Die
Notwendigkeit, von der die Gesellschaft beherrscht wird, könnte in diesem Sinn als biologisch angesehen
und der besondere Charakter der kritischen Theorie deshalb bezweifelt werden, weil in der Biologie wie
auch in anderen Naturwissenschaften in ähnlicher Weise einzelne Verläufe theoretisch konstruiert werden,
wie es nach dem oben Dargelegten in der kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft geschieht.”
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Horkheimer’s earlier reflections on purposiveness in Kantian philosophy resonate here.
He believes that theoretical work always requires arguments about cause and necessity in
the relationships between phenomena, and that the biological approach to the living
organism thus has many parallels to a potential critical theory of society.
Horkheimer must then also address a commonplace analogy in biological thought
and argument: the claim that society is a kind of organism, and (indirectly) that inquiry
into social phenomena can best be reduced to inquiry into living things. He dismisses
such arguments with a reminder that the parts of an organism, unlike the members of
society, are not mediated through reason. Here his youthful Gestalt-holist arguments
about emergent phenomena themselves return:
Reason cannot become transparent to itself as long as human beings act as the
limbs of an organism without reason. As a naturally growing and dissipating
unity, the organism is not a sort of model for society, but rather a hollow form of
being from which it must emancipate itself.115
Those who pursue critical theory must therefore be aware of slippage between it and
biological modes of thought, in order to avoid any appearance that critical theory is
simply biology by another name.
Horkheimer’s work in the early critical theory period thus interrogates biology
through the broader stakes of the rereading of materialism. Critical theory had to be
interested in biology because the concept of biology itself demonstrated that the
intractable problems of disciplinary distinction in the life sciences functioned in parallel
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Horkheimer, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” 28-29. „Die Vernunft kann sich selbst nicht
durchsichtig werden, solange die Menschen als Glieder eines vernuftlosen Organismus handeln. Der
Organismus als natürlich wachsende und vergehende Einheit ist für die Gesellschaft nicht etwa ein Vorbild,
sondern eine dumpfe Seinsform, aus der sie sich zu emanzipieren hat.”
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with claims to total theoretical explanation – including the explanation of social
phenomena. Life scientists participated in biology as a narrative of complete knowledge
of living things and their environments, and because those environments could be read
socially, social scientists also participated similarly. Biology allowed scholars of the
living, the human, and the social to make both narrowly focused investigational claims
and claims about human affairs that breached the categories of the political and
ideological. Direct sub-disciplinary associations and investigational techniques tended to
insulate life scientists from criticism that their claims were too broad. Social scientists
rarely had that luxury, yet they could not easily differentiate themselves from the sphere
of biology. Biology thus necessarily formed a primary boundary around the interests of
Horkheimer and his Institut colleagues, and their encounters with that boundary brought
them into contact and conflict with scholars like Thurnwald and Mühlmann who were
pursuing similar goals mapped onto other disciplinary and conceptual categories.
Biology seemed to describe the limits of all of the fields of research into social
phenomena that these scholars were working to establish, including Sozialforschung,
Soziologie, and Völkersoziologie, and they themselves came to understand and to
represent it as the spark of their disagreements. The National Socialist appropriation of
socially oriented biological argument further raised the stakes of their conflicts because it
threw all personal political interests and investments into high relief. Seventy years later
the troubled encounter between biology and social research remains an ever-present
source of rancor.
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